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Costly monitoring may lead to credit rationing in equilibrium in an economy without any
adverse selection or moral hazard problems. Given the widespread phenomenon of government
intervention in credit markets in developing and developed countries, the natural question then
is, How effective are these government programs? I incorporate government loan programs in
a simple, closed, pure exchange economy with borrowing and lending. Intermediation of funds
is facilitated in credit markets characterized by a costly state verification problem. I then show
that government loan programs (financed with lump-sum taxes) with co-financing can increase
credit rationing when the private lender is the prior claimant in the event of a default. Moreover
such programs unambiguously decrease the expected utility of both borrowers and lenders. On
the other hand, when the government is the prior claimant, such programs decrease credit
rationing and increase the expected utility of borrowers. Finally, with proportional repayments
there is no effect on credit rationing or expected utility of agents.
JEL classification codes: H81, G33
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I. Introduction
Intervention by the government in financial markets is a common occurrence in
both developed and under-developed countries.1 In the United States, for
example, the Small Business Administration (SBA) provides loan guarantees up
to almost 90 percent of an eligible loan made by financial institutions.2 Moreover,
* Dona Rai: 535 Pierce Street #2312, Albany 94706 (email: dona.rai@kautilya.org). An earlier
version of this paper has appeared in my unpublished doctoral dissertation. I would like to
thank Bruce Smith for many helpful suggestions. I would also like to thank Scott Freeman,
Dean Corbae, and Peter Debaere for helpful comments and criticisms. Finally, I would like to
thank two anonymous referees whose detailed comments led to significant improvements. All
errors are mine.
1 For examples of government intervention in the United States, see Smith and Stutzer (1989),
Li (1999) and Williamson (1994). For government intervention in developing countries, see
McKinnon (1973).
2 See Smith and Stutzer (1989) for further discussion. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 362
over the years, the volume of such loan guarantees has steadily increased (see
Li 1999).
The increasing popularity of Government Credit Programs raises a natural
question. Given that credit markets are perfectly competitive, it seems possible
that equilibrium outcomes are Pareto efficient. This implies that intervention by
the government in perfectly competitive markets would only be welfare decreasing.
But if credit markets are operating inefficiently due to imperfect information, leading
to credit rationing in equilibrium (see Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Williamson 1986,
1987; and Boyd and Smith 1997, 1998), can government credit programs improve
welfare?
Several papers have addressed this issue by incorporating government credit
programs in an economy with credit market frictions. For example Smith and Stutzer
(1989) analyze government loan programs, like loan guarantees, direct loans and
equity participation loans. In their model, credit is rationed to low risk borrowers
due to an adverse selection problem. They show that some types of loan programs,
such as loan guarantees issued through lenders, might improve economic efficiency.
They also show that the incentive for high risk borrowers to masquerade as low
risk borrowers worsens under other forms of loans like direct lending to rationed
borrowers. Thus they highlight the significance of conducting model-specific policy
analysis. Li (1998) studies loan programs in the presence of financial market frictions
caused by moral hazard problems. According to her, credit programs cannot lead
to efficiency gains since the government does not have any information or
technology advantage over private lenders. So, the paper analyzes the distributional
effects of government credit programs.
Williamson (1994) studies credit programs like loan guarantees and direct loans
in two types of credit markets: one where frictions are due a costly state verification
(CSV) problem, first analyzed by Townsend (1979), and second, where frictions are
due to an adverse selection problem. He concludes that direct loans have no effect
because government lending simply displaces an equal quantity of private lending.
And loan guarantees have no effect if there is no credit rationing prior to the
government intervention, and finally, if there is credit rationing, the loan guarantee
program have perverse effects: interest rates faced by lenders (borrowers) decrease
(increase) and credit rationing becomes worse. In markets where frictions are due
to moral hazard, he infers that if government loan interest rates are set appropriately,
then the welfare of targeted groups may increase.
My paper deviates from the above papers by analyzing government credit363 CREDIT RATIONING AND GOVERNMENT CREDIT PROGRAMS
programs wherein the government is a co-financier along with a financial institution
or an intermediary. The motivation for this analysis is that co-financing by the
government and financial institutions or intermediaries is widespread. For example,
since 1970 the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has arranged a total of 35 billion
dollars of co-financing for 557 projects in member countries. This is only slightly
less than the amount raised by the ADB in international capital markets and is
nearly double the amount ADB obtained from its Asian Development Fund (ADF)
donors. Thus the ADB actively promotes co-financing with funds from commercial
financial institutions, official funding agencies and export credit agencies. Funding
from official sources include official development assistance provided by donor
governments from their budget appropriations, usually in the form of grants and
loans.
The World Bank also encourages and helps its borrowers to obtain additional
financing from other sources for projects assisted by the World Bank in the form of
co-financing. The sources are varied, and include government bilateral aid programs,
regional development banks, export credit agencies and commercial banks. In fact,
almost half of the Bank assisted projects now involve other sources of financing.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), since its
inception in 1991, has also actively promoted co-financing in its member countries.
The second motivation for this analysis is that this paper also attempts to
contribute to the growing literature on insolvency systems. Levine, Loayza and
Beck (2000), show that financial intermediary development exerts an economically
large positive impact on growth.3 La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997,
1998), emphasize the importance of well functioning insolvency systems in
influencing the development of financial systems.4 Moreover, according to
Claessens and Klapper (2002), there is a growing interest in the design of bankruptcy
systems with regard to resource allocation and efficiency.5 For example, one of the
objectives of the EBRD in recent years has been to help in the development of
legal rules in the area of bankruptcy for its countries in transition.6 Rowat (1999)
3 For examples of theoretical models, see Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Bencivenga
and Smith (1991).
4 See also Levine, Loayxa and Beck (2002).
5 They use data on relative number of bankruptcy filings in 35 countries to investigate which
legal, financial and other country characteristics affect the probability of a bankruptcy procedure
being used. See also Stiglitz (2001) and Hart (2000).
6 See Averch (2002). JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 364
notes that while Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica and Peru have recently updated
their bankruptcy laws, many other countries in Latin America, including Brazil and
Mexico, are trying to redesign their insolvency laws. And in Asia, the ADB is
conducting regional studies, like the Insolvency Law Reform Project, to better
comprehend the problems and reforms of bankruptcy laws.
In the theoretical literature, Hausch and Ramachandran (1999) develop a market
based ACCORD scheme - Auction-based Creditor Ordering by Reducing Debts -
where creditors form a queue, and are serviced in sequence. Creditors bid for their
position in the queue.7 They then determine equilibrium bidding strategies and
show that economic resources are better used under this scheme, and also increases
the firm’s managers incentive to manage the firm more efficiently. My paper
addresses the question of insolvency when the government is a creditor along
with a private lender. I show that the order in which the creditors, in this case the
private lender and the government, are serviced has economic implications.
Specifically, when the private lender is the prior claimant, the default probability
increases, which causes economic inefficiency. On the other hand when the
government is the prior claimant, the default probability decreases. Finally, when
repayment is proportional to the amount of the loan, there is no change. The
relevance of such a model is supported by real world evidence. For example, in the
United States, a creditor may have a priority interest which arises through a
statutory law. The implication is that a creditor with a priority must be paid his debt
before other creditors can be paid. Congress has granted priority to debts owed to
the Federal government.
To carry out the analysis, I consider a closed pure exchange economy where
some agents (lenders) are endowed with investment goods, while some agents
(borrowers) are endowed with a linear technology that can convert investment
goods into consumption goods. Credit markets are characterized by frictions caused
by the presence of a CSV problem. Williamson (1986, 1987) showed credit rationing
can arise endogenously in equilibrium in such an economy. A natural question
then is: Does government intervention reduce the number of borrowers who are
denied credit? And what are the distributional effects of such programs in the
presence of credit market frictions? And, in the event of a bankruptcy, what is the
most efficient way to allocate resources to creditors?
In this paper, I follow the approach of Williamson (1986, 1987) and Boyd and
7 Those accepting higher reductions in their claimants are placed ahead of those willing to let
go smaller proportions of their claims.365 CREDIT RATIONING AND GOVERNMENT CREDIT PROGRAMS
Smith (1997, 1998), and assume that frictions in credit markets take the form of a
CSV problem. Project returns are assumed to be unobservable except to the project
owner. Any other agent can observe the outcome only after incurring a fixed
monitoring cost. Monitoring becomes necessary when the project owner defaults,
that is, declares bankruptcy. Due to the fact that there are now co-financiers, three
possible scenarios can be visualized. One, where the private lender is the prior
claimant; two, where the government is the prior claimant; and three, when
repayment is proportional to the amount of the loan. I assume that the loan programs
are funded by imposing a lump-sum tax on lenders. I conclude that efficiency gains
and distribution effects differ in the two scenarios, reinforcing Smith’s and Stutzer’s
claim that policy analysis must necessarily be model specific. Specifically, when
the private lender is the prior claimant in the event of a default, credit rationing
increases. Moreover, the expected utility of all agents, borrowers and lenders,
decrease. On the other hand, if the government is the prior claimant, credit rationing
decreases, the expected utility of borrowers increase, while the expected utility of
lenders may or may not increase. Finally, the proportional repayment policy has
neutral effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the benchmark
model, that is, the equilibrium outcome when there is no intervention. Section III
analyzes credit programs where the government is a co-financier along with a
private lender. I consider all three cases in turn: one where the private lender is the
prior claimant, two where the government is the prior claimant while the private
lender is the residual claimant, and three when the repayment is proportional to the
amount of the loan. Finally, Section IV concludes.
II. Model
I consider an environment where there is an infinite sequence of two period lived
agents. At each date a continuum of young agents of unit mass is born. Time is
discrete and is indexed by t =0,1,2,3,…
Agents are of two types, namely borrowers and lenders. I assume that a
proportion a of the population are lenders while a proportion 1- a  are borrowers.
Borrowers and lenders differ from each other in only two respects. Lenders are
endowed with y units of the investment good in period one, while borrowers
receive no such endowments. Secondly, borrowers have access to a linear stochastic
technology which can convert investment goods into consumption goods. This
technology is unavailable to lenders. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 366
This linear stochastic technology operates as follows. Investing q units of the
investment good in period one yields zq units of the consumption good in period
two. Thus, this technology is indivisible, such that, to initiate any project, at least
q units must be invested. This assumption of indivisibility follows Williamson
(1986, 1987), Bernanke and Gerther (1989) and Boyd and Smith (1997, 1998). The
variable z is an i.i.d. (both across agents and periods) random variable, with
probability density function given by p(z) and the cumulative distribution function
denoted by P(z). I assume that P(z) is continuous and twice differentiable and the






The realization of z on any investment project is costlessly observable only by
the project owner. Any other agent can observe the value of z only after incurring
a fixed monitoring cost of g units of the consumption good. This assumption is
standard in models that are characterized by a CSV problem. See Boyd and Smith
(1997, 1998).8 Although z can be costlessly observed by the project owner, all
agents know the density function p(z ).
Finally, I assume that borrowers and lenders are identical with respect to
preferences. Both care about consumption in old age only and they are both risk
neutral.9 Therefore, all young period endowment is saved and invested in the
linear technology via intermediation.
A. Credit markets
All young lenders receive y units of the investment good as endowments. Since
agents are concerned only with old age consumption, all of the endowment is
saved. This is inelastically supplied in credit markets in period one. Borrowers
have no endowments, so they need to borrow q units to initiate their project.
These transactions can be thought of as being facilitated via banks or intermediaries.
That is, any lender or group of lenders can form an intermediary. In addition, by
appealing to the law of large numbers, I can infer that monitoring the intermediary
is unnecessary since they face a non-stochastic return on their portfolio. Finally, I
assume that the proportion of borrowers exceeds that of lenders, so that the
following is true:
q y ) 1 ( a a - <
That is, there is not enough credit to finance all potential projects.
8 In Boyd and Smith (1997) units of capital are used in monitoring.
9 This assumption has been made for tractability.
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To obtain external finance, borrowers announce loan contracts of the form
described by Williamson (1986). These contracts are then evaluated by lenders or
intermediaries and are either accepted or rejected on the basis of the expected
return they offer. I let r denote the expected market rate which will be endogenously
determined in the model, but is treated as a parameter by all agents.
A loan contract must specify the following objects. A set A of project return
realizations in which verification takes place and a set B of project return realizations
in which verification does not take place.10 Clearly, verification is necessary in
some states. The repayment schedule if verification takes place, that is if  zÎA, is
state contingent and is denoted by R(z). If  zÎB, then verification does not take
place, and the repayment schedule must necessarily be independent of the state.
I denote this by some constant x (per unit borrowed), which needs to be determined.
The optimal contract, then, is the loan repayment pair [R(z), x]  which maximizes the
expected utility of the borrower subject to the feasibility, incentive compatibility
and participation constraints. The solution to this problem is a standard debt
contract given by11
zq z R = ) (
) 0, [ x A = .
In other words, if the realization z is such that z ³ x, then the borrower pays xq
to the lender and no monitoring takes place. On the other hand if z < x the borrower
then defaults on her loan repayment and declares bankruptcy. The lender
expends g units, monitors the project and gets zq while the borrower receives
nothing. Given the optimal debt contract, the expected return to the lender per
unit borrowed q is
10 Note that I do not allow for stochastic monitoring. While Mookherjee and Png (1989) show
that contracts with stochastic monitoring are optimal, Boyd and Smith (1994) show that gains
with stochastic monitoring are trivial with realistic parameter values.
11 See Williamson (1986) for a proof.
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using integration by parts and rearranging terms. Thus, the expected return to the
lender is a function of the loan repayment x and (g/q). Following Williamson (1986),
I assume that p11<0 holds, so
] [0, 0 ) ( ) ( z x x p
q













) ( = ¢ . When this is true, the function p looks as depicted in
Figure 1. Clearly, there is a unique value for x, say x*, that maximizes the expected
return to the lender. Then x* solves:










So, as noted by Williamson (1986), credit rationing can easily arise
endogenously in equilibrium. By equation (1) total demand for credit exceeds the
total supply, so borrowers who are denied credit will try to bid up the interest rate
they offer.  However, the interest rate can only be bid up to the maximum value x*,
beyond which the expected return to the lender decreases due to increasing
monitoring costs. Thus, if equations (1) and (5) hold at all time t, credit will be
rationed in equilibrium. I focus on this case throughout the paper.
III. Government lending program
The presence of imperfect information between borrowers and lenders leads to an
equilibrium in which some borrowers are denied credit, resulting in some investments
going unfunded. Can this rationing provide a potential rationale for a welfare
improving intervention by the government?
I will consider the case in which the government co-finances a project, along
with a private lender or an intermediary. That is, the government will finance a
fraction d of the total amount borrowed. In other words, since the borrower needs
q units of the investment good to initiate her project, the government lends qd
while private lenders lend q(1-d ). I assume that these programs are financed by
levying a lump-sum tax of r units on young lenders. Then, as before, borrowers
announce loan contracts, which specify a set of project return realizations for
which verification takes place, a set of project return realizations for which
verification does not take place and a loan repayment schedule  ] ) ( [ z R x, . Then, if
(5)
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non-verification state occurs, the private lender receives  q x ) 1 ( d - while the
government receives  q xd  as repayment. However, if verification state occurs,
that is the borrower defaults, there are two possible outcomes. In the first, the
private lender is the prior claimant while the government is the residual claimant,
and in the second, the government is the prior claimant while the private lender is
the residual claimant. I consider each of the two cases in order.
A. Private lender is the prior claimant
Each project is now jointly co-financed by a private lender and the government.
As before, borrowers announce loan contracts to get credit. In this scenario with
more than one lender for one borrower, each contract must specify sets Ap and Ag
of project return realizations for which verification takes place by the private lender
and the government respectively. It must also specify a set B of project return
realizations for which verification does not take place. Lastly, the contract must
specify the loan repayments Rp (z) and Rg (z) to the private lender and the JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 370
government respectively when verification occurs by either of the two parties.
Obviously, both repayments can be state contingent. Finally, the contract specifies
the repayments xp and xg  to the private lender and the government, respectively, in
the event that no verification takes place. Finally, I note that, the sets Ap and Ag  are
mutually exclusive, that the second claimant receives nothing if the first claimant
monitors the project, and that if the project is monitored by the second claimant it
follows that the first claimant must have received the constant payment xp.
The loan repayment schedule must be feasible:
zq z R z R
g p £ + £ ) ( ) ( 0 ,
z x x
g p inf 0 £ + £ .
The repayment schedule must be incentive compatible, so the borrower
truthfully reveals when a monitoring state has ocurred:
g p g p g p A A z q x x z R z R È Î " + £ + ) ( ) ( ) ( .
In addition, the expected return to the lender must be at least the market interest
rate r:
ò ò È
- ³ + -
g p A B
p
A
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Then the optimal contract is the loan repayment schedule
)] ), ( ( ), ), ( [(
g g p p x z R x z R which maximizes the expected utility of the borrower
subject to the feasibility, incentive compatibility and participation constraints.
That is,
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schedule is the standard debt contract given by12
) 1 ( ) ( d - < = x z for zq z R
p
)) 1 ( , 0 [ d - = x A
p
x z x for xq zq z R
g < £ - - - = ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( d d
) ), 1 ( [ x x A
g d - =
So, if z³ x, the private lender receives x(1- d) q and the government receives xdq
and no monitoring takes place. However, if the project return zq is less than the
loan repayment constant x(1 - d)q, the borrower declares bankruptcy to the private
lender. Since the private lender is the first claimant, she will monitor the project
after incurring a cost of g units of the consumption good and receive zq while the
government receives zero returns. If, on the other hand, x(1 - d) £ z<x, then the
private lender receives her full share of x(1 - d)q, while the government becomes
the residual claimant, receiving zq- x(1 - d)q, after expending g units on monitoring.
Then, given the optimal debt contract above, the expected return schedule to
the private lender can be written as
ò ò
- -
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where the first term denotes the return if monitoring take place (that is, z<x(1 - d), the
second term is the return if the private lender does not monitor, and the third term
is the monitoring cost incurred by the private lender with probability P(x(1 - d)).
Dividing by q(1 - d) and rearranging terms yields the expected return to the





12 The objective function of the borrower is the same as before. In addition, the feasibility and
the incentive compatibility constraints are also the same. The participation constraint, how-
ever, is different. Monitoring is costly for lenders. The intuition underlying the Williamson
result is that the optimal contract is the one that minimizes the monitoring cost. In other
words, the contract that maximizes the objective function of the borrower is the one that
minimizes the monitoring cost. In this case, as well, the standard debt contract achieves that.
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Next, I need an expression for the expected return to the government. The
government is the residual claimant, so monitoring by the government occurs if
and only if  . ) 1 ( x z x < £ -d In such a scenario, the government expends g units on
monitoring while receiving zq – xq(1 - d) units. Finally, the government receives
nothing if  ), 1 ( d - £ x z and receives xdq if z ³ x. Mathematically, the expected
return to the government is given by
ò ò - -
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Dividing by qd and rearranging terms, yields the expected return per amount
borrowed
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Clearly, it is evident that the convex combination of the expected returns to the
private lender and the government is equal to the expected return without
government intervention, where the weights are 1- d and d respectively. So,
. ) 1 ( 2 1
G P dp p d p + - =
Again, due to assumption (18),  P
1 p looks as depicted in Figure 2. A unique loan
repayment value,  x ~ exists that maximizes the expected return to the private lender.
The following proposition then shows how  x ~ changes with increases in d .
Proposition 1. The loan repayment  x ~ and the expected return to the lender is
greater under government intervention than without it. Moreover, they are both
increasing in d .
Proof in appendix.
The expected return to the private lender is positively related to the loan
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repayment rate and negatively related to the monitoring cost. The return to the
prior claimant is higher than the return to the residual claimant. Therefore, at each
value of the loan repayment rate x, the expected return is higher. In order to obtain
credit, borrowers try to bid up the interest rate. Because the expected return is
higher, the interest rate can be bid up to a value above x*.13
I next examine how the expected return to the government varies as d varies.
Clearly this is important from the lenders’ point of view, since high expected returns
to the government may translate into lower lump-sum taxes for lenders. Using
result (A2) in Appendix by which  ) ~ ( 1 x
P p =  ) 1 /( *) ( d p - x in (21) yields:
13 The expected return schedule of the government lies below the expected return schedule of
the private lender. Therefore, the government is receiving a rate of return that is lower than
the market rate. In addition, the return is also lower than p(x*), the market rate without
intervention. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 374
*). ( ) ~ ( ) ~ ( 2 x x x
G p p dp - =
Now, since  *, ~ x x > and  , 0 *) ( = ¢ x p it must be true that,  0 ) ~ ( < ¢ x p at  . ~ x x = From






x and so it follows that  G
2 dp is decreasing in d. This is summed
up in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. The expected return to the government decreases with increases
in d. Moreover, the total return  ) ~ ( 2 x q
G dp also falls as the proportion of the
government loan program d   increases.
To carry out these loan programs, the government needs revenue. I assume
that each lender has to pay t units of their endowment as lump-sum tax when
young.14 This revenue is then utilized by the government to co-finance the
investment projects of the borrowers. The proportion of lenders in the economy is
a, each of whom receive y units of the investment good as endowment, so the total
revenue collected by taxation is at. By assumption (1) and (18), credit rationing
arises in equilibrium. Let q denote the proportion of borrowers who receive credit.
The proportion of borrowers in the economy is (1- a), so a proportion (1- a)q of
borrowers operate projects. Total government expenditure is then simply (1- a)q
qd. However, the government also receives  G
2 p from its loan programs, so the
government budget constraint is
, ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
G q q dp q a d q a at - - - =
which yields, rearranging terms,
). 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
G q p d q a at - - =
One other aggregate condition remains in order to complete the description of
equilibrium of the economy. Since lenders receive y units as endowment and pay a
lump-sum tax of t units, sources of funds equal uses of funds when
q d a t a ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( - - = - q y
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Equation (25) can be used to plug in for t  in the aggregate budget constraint. This
gives q as a function of  G
2 dp ,






















Proposition 3. When the government co-finances a project with a private lender
and is the second claimant in the event of a bankruptcy, the proportion of
borrowers who are denied credit increases, as compared to the case without
government intervention.
Because of intervention, the loan repayment rate is higher. This increases the
probability of default, and, consequently, total monitoring costs also increase. As
more resources are expended in monitoring, less resources are available for funding
projects. Thus, intervention distorts equilibrium, leading to increased inefficiency.
Finally, I will show how the welfare of lenders and borrowers are affected by this
government loan program. For lenders, the expected return on loans increases, but
they also pay a lump-sum tax. Lenders are only concerned with second period
consumption, and so all of their first period endowment minus the tax is saved.
This saving earns an expected return of  ). 1 /( *) ( d p - x Therefore, the expected




























l EU Thus the program
is welfare decreasing for lenders. Expected return is greater; however, this increased
return is offset by the lump-sum tax that lenders are required to pay in order to fund
(26)
(27)
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the government program. How does this program affect the expected utility of
borrowers? Let EUb denote the expected utility of borrowers who receive funding.
The expected utility of borrowers in general then is simply q EUb. Borrowers receive
total output from the project minus expected return to both lenders and total
monitoring costs. Again, borrowers are primarily concerned with second period
consumption; therefore, expected utility of funded borrowers is
). ~ ( ) ~ ( ˆ ) ~ ( ) ~ ( ) ~ ( ) 1 ( ˆ 2 1 x P x q q z x P x q x q q z EU
G P
b g p g dp p d - - = - - - - =
Then, using (4),  , 0
~















x Thus, expected utility
of funded borrowers decreases in equilibrium. This is so because, borrowers are
now paying a higher loan repayment rate or a higher interest rate on their loans.























That is, the expected utility of all borrowers decreases in equilibrium. This leads to
the final result in this section.
Proposition 4. The government loan program makes everyone worse off in the
sense that the expected utility of lenders, as well as the expected utility of both
funded and unfunded borrowers decreases.
Both agents are worse off because of intervention. Lenders are worse off
because the government is levying a lump-sum tax. And, borrowers are worse off
because of two reasons. One, because of the higher loan repayment rate, and two,
because more borrowers are now denied credit in equilibrium. It is easy to produce
numerical examples to show that intervention with private lender as prior claimant
increases credit rationing. Here is one example that does so.
Example 1: Let p(z) = 1/z. Then if z = 2, a = 0.7, q = 0.5, g = 0.7 and y = 0.1,
then it can be easily verified that x* = 0.6, p = 0.09  and q = 0.47. So, expected
return to the lender is EUl = 0.009 and expected return to the borrower is EUb =
0.781. If the government co-finances loans with d=0.1 then,
, 67 . 0 ~ = x , 1 . 0 1 =
P p , 12 . 0 2 - =
G p and  . 46 . 0 = q Finally, expected return to the
lender is EUl = 0.0089  and expected return to the borrower is EUb = 0.731.
(29)
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In short, the government loan program, with the private lender as the prior
claimant, and the government as the residual claimant, is detrimental to the economy.
Expected utility of lenders is lower, while more borrowers are credit rationed.
Moreover, borrowers pay a higher loan repayment rate. In this sense, this program
works very similar to a loan guarantee program. The reasoning behind the results
is simple. The return to the prior claimant is always higher than the return to the
second claimant, because for some values of the project realization z the residual
claimant receives nothing. The private lender seeks to maximize her own returns.
As before, interest rates will be bid up as borrowers try to obtain credit. The
interest rate will be bid up as long as returns to the lender are increasing. Because
she is now the prior claimant, her total monitoring costs are lower. As a result,
expected returns will be increasing even at x = x*. So the equilibrium loan repayment
rate is now going to be bid up to a higher rate. This in turn implies that default
probability is higher, leading to higher monitoring costs. Hence less funds are now
available for investment, consequently increasing credit rationing. Moreover, low
returns for the government implies that taxes have to be higher in order to fund
these loan programs. The private lender fails to take this into account when
maximizing her return from lending investment projects. Finally, the expected utility
of borrowers also declines because of the higher loan repayment rate.
B. Government is the prior claimant
I turn to the case where the government is the prior claimant and the private lender
is the residual claimant. Again, I assume that the government finances its loan
program by imposing a lump-sum tax of t units on the young lenders.
As before, the government and the private lender co-finance projects, with the
government lending a fraction d of the total amount q, and the private lender
lending the remaining (1-d )q. Borrowers then announce loan contracts of the form
described in the previous section. That is, contracts must specify sets Ap and Ag of
project return realizations for which verification takes place by the private lender
and the government, respectively.15 It must also specify a set B of project return
realizations for which no verification takes place. Lastly, the contract must specify
the loan repayments Rp(z) and Rg(z) to the private lender and the government,
15 Note that I am using the same notation for convenience, but these values are clearly different
from the previous case where the private lender is the prior claimant. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 378
respectively, when verification occurs by either one of the two parties. Finally, the
contract specifies the repayments xp and xg  to the private lender and the government
respectively, for instances when no verification occurs.
The loan repayment schedule must continue to satisfy the feasibility and
incentive compatibility constraints so that equations (7), (8) and (9) hold. In
addition, the expected return to the lender must be at least the market interest rate,
so that the following equation is true:
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Then the optimal contract is the loan repayment schedule
)] ), ( ( ), ), ( [(
g g p p x z R x z R which maximizes the expected utility of the borrower
subject to the feasibility, incentive compatibility and participation constraints.
That is, the optimal contract solves,
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subject to the constraints (7), (8), (9) and (31). Then, as before, the optimal repayment
schedule is the standard debt contract given by
, ) ( x z x for xq zq z R
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If zÎB, then no verification is necessary and the government receives qdx
while the private lender receives q(1- d)x. On the other hand, if z ÏB, then verification
is necessary. But now, if 0 £ z<xd, then private lenders receive nothing, while the
(31)
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government expends g units on monitoring and claims zq units. However, if xd£
z<xd, then the government receives its share of xdq, while the private lender is now
the residual claimant, receiving zq - xdq, after expending g units on monitoring.
From the above contract, the expected return to the private lender can now be
written as
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Dividing by q(1-d) and rearranging terms yields the expected return per amount
borrowed
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Similarly, the expected return to the government is given by
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Dividing by qd and rearranging terms yields the expected return per amount
borrowed,
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Again, as before, the convex combination of the expected return to the
government and the private lender is equal to the expected return to the lender
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Proposition 5 is then immediate.
Proposition 5. When the government is the prior claimant and the private
lender the residual claimant, the optimal loan repayment  * x x < and
*). ( ) ( x x p p <
Proof in Appendix.
The effect on the expected return schedule of the private lender is now the
exact opposite. She is now the residual claimant, so at each loan repayment rate x,
the expected return schedule is lower as depicted in Figure 3. Here, with intervention,
the expected return schedule is lower. Thus, the loan repayment rate is also lower.
(42)
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Again, to carry out these loan programs, the government needs revenue. As in
the previous section, I assume that the government resorts to taxing each of the
young lenders, an amount of t goods. As before, assumptions (1) and (39) hold,
leading to credit being rationed in equilibrium. Thus, only a proportion q of
borrowers receive credit, while a proportion 1-q are denied credit. It then follows
that the government budget constraint given by equation (24) continues to hold.
In addition, lenders receive y units of the investment good as endowment and are
required to pay a lump-sum tax of t units. Thus, the aggregate budget constraint
given by equation (25) holds. Consequently, equation (26) will also hold. Proposition
6 then follows immediately.
Proposition 6. When the government co-finances a project with a private
lender, and is the prior claimant, the proportion of borrowers who are denied
credit decreases.
Proof in Appendix.
From Proposition 5, the loan repayment rate is lower. Clearly then, the probability
that the borrower will default on her loan repayment is also lower. A lower default
probability then translates into lower monitoring costs. Because of this increased
efficiency, more borrowers can be funded in equilibrium.
As long as the expected return to the private lender is increasing, borrowers
will continue to bid up the interest rate in order to obtain credit. Because the
government is the prior claimant, the expected return schedule of the government
is above the expected return schedule of the private lender. In this case, the return
to the government is greater than the market return.
Finally, the change in welfare of borrowers and lenders as a result of conducting
this government credit program needs to be addressed. Lenders now face lower
interest rates, and in addition pay a lump-sum tax of t units. Lenders are concerned
with second period consumption, so using result (A8) in Appendix their expected
utility is
Mutatis mutandis, plugging in for (y - t) from (25) and (26) and simplifying yields
,
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so that  *) (x y EUl p £ or  *). (x y EUl p ³  The effect on the expected utility of
lenders may increase or decrease. The expected return to the lender is less than the
expected return without intervention. If  G
1 p is high enough, the government may
make a profit on the program. In particular, if  , 1 1 >
G p t becomes a subsidy. In this
case, expected utility of lenders may increase in equilibrium.
Next, I turn my attention to borrowers. As before, the expected utility of
borrowers is the return from operating the project, minus the expected return to
both the lenders and expected monitoring costs. Borrowers have no endowment
and pay no taxes, so their expected utility is simply
So, expected utility of borrowers who obtain credit increases. The expected
utility of borrowers in general is given by EUb. Clearly, since, q has increased, the
expected utility of borrowers in general also increases. Borrowers are better off
because they are now paying a lower loan repayment rate. I sum this up in the last
result in this section.
Proposition 7. When the government is the prior claimant in the event of a default,
co-financing leads to an increase in expected utility of borrowers, while it may
or may not increase the expected utility of lenders.
The government loan program, in which the government and the private lender
are co-financiers, and the government is the prior claimant, leads to the funding of
more projects in the economy. The reasoning behind the results is simple. The
return to the prior claimant is always higher than the return to the residual claimant,
because for some values of z the residual claimant receives nothing. The private
lender seeks to maximize her own returns. Again, as before, interest rates will be
bid up as long as the expected return to the private lender is increasing. Expected
return to the private lender is lower, because her monitoring cost is now higher. As
a result, the loan repayment rate can now be bid up to a lower value. This means
that default probability is lower, leading to lower monitoring costs.
The return to the government is positive. Note that, in the previous case, the
return was negative. From equation (26), it is clear that this decreases credit rationing
in equilibrium. But, are resources simply being redistributed from lenders to
borrowers without any increase in efficiency? The key to the answer lies in the fact
*) ( *) ( ˆ x P x q q z g p - - >
) ( ) ( ˆ ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ˆ 1 2 x P x q q z x P x q x q q z EU
G P
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that monitoring costs are lower when the government is the prior claimant. So,
more resources are available in order to fund projects. In other words, total output
net of monitoring costs is higher with intervention with government as the prior
claimant.
Again its easy to produce examples to show that credit rationing decreases
when the government is the prior claimant. Here is one that does so.
Example 2: Let p(z) = 1/z. Then if z = 2,a = 0.7, q = 0.5, g = 0.7 and y = 0.1, then
it can be easily verified that x* = 0.6, p = 0.09  and q = 0.47. Expected return to the
lender is EUl = 0.009 and expected return to the borrower is EUb = 0.781. If the
government co-finances loans with d = 0.1, then x = 0.54,  , 08 . 0 2 =
P p 16 . 0 1 =
G p and
. 48 . 0 = q  Finally, expected return to the lender is EUl = 0.0075 and expected return
to the borrower is EUb = 0.80.
In this case, expected utility to the lender is lower while expected utility of the
borrower increases. Why does credit rationing decrease in equilibrium? The answer
has to do with the lower loan repayment rate, which results in lower monitoring
costs. To see this more clearly, note that total output net of monitoring costs
without intervention is  79 . 0 *) ( ˆ = - x P q z g and with intervention is
. 81 . 0 ) ( ˆ = - x P q z g  Finally, lenders are worse off because of the lower return and
higher taxes.
I do not study the determination of the optimal share d. To find the optimum d,
we have to differentiate  ) ( 1 x
G dp with respect to d and equate the resulting equation
to zero, that is,  . 0
























The optimum d depends
on the distribution of p(z). For example, if z is uniform, it can be easily demonstrated
that  . 0







C. Repayments are proportional to loans
In this case, I assume that repayments and monitoring costs are proportional to
the amount of the loan. As before, the government and the private lender finance
projects, with the government lending a fraction d and the private lender lending
the remaining fraction 1-d of the project. However, in this case both the monitoring
cost and repayments are proportional to the amount of the loan. That is, in the JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 384
verification state, the private lender receives  ) ( ) 1 ( z Ri d - after incurring a cost
g d) 1 ( -  on monitoring, while the government receives  ) (z Ri d as loan repayment
after incurring a cost  g d on monitoring. Finally, the contract specifies the
repayments xi in the no verification state, of which  i x ) 1 ( d - goes to the private
lender and  i x d goes to the government.
Setting up the problem as before, and solving it, clearly demonstrates that the
expected return per unit lent to the private lender is





P x P q dz z P x
i
g p - - = ò
Comparing equations (4) and (46), it is clear that the expected return is the
same. This in turn implies that there is no change in the loan repayment value, and
consequently, the probability of default and monitoring cost is also unchanged.
Thus, there is no effect on credit rationing. In addition borrowers are neither worse
nor better off. This is the outcome, because the loan repayment rate is the same.
How does this affect the expected utility of lenders? To evaluate this effect, I first
need to calculate the expected return to the government. Again one can clearly
demonstrate that the expected return to the government is given by
From the above equation, it is clear that the expected utility is also unchanged.16
To see this more clearly, note that if the government returns from this policy are
given back to the old lenders as subsidy, the expected return to the lenders is
given by
P G P y y p tp p t = + - ) (
Clearly, from the above equation, there is no change in the expected utility of
lenders because of the policy. This outcome occurs because, when repayments
and monitoring costs are proportional to loans, from the borrowers’ point of view,
(46)
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p g p = - - = ò
(47)
16 In this case, the return to the government is positive. But unlike in the case where the
government is the prior claimant, this is merely due to a redistribution of resources. There is no
change in monitoring costs, and hence no change in efficiency.
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both the government and the formal private lender effectively behave as one
lender. Hence the government loan program with proportional repayments
essentially has no effect. This further demonstrates that the seniority of the debt
is the key to deciphering the effects of loans in a credit rationed economy.
IV. Conclusions
As demonstrated by several authors, credit market frictions in the form of
asymmetric information may lead to endogenously arising credit rationing. How
effective, then, are government credit programs given that such frictions are a
common phenomenon? I analyze one type of government credit programs, namely
co-financing of loans in a closed economy with no production in which a CSV
problem in credit markets leads credit to be rationed in equilibrium. I show that co-
financing of loans, along with a private lender, is detrimental to the economy when
the private lender is the prior claimant in the event of a bankruptcy. Credit rationing
increases in equilibrium and the expected utility of all agents, lenders and borrowers
decrease. On the other hand, when the government is the prior claimant, the
proportion of borrowers who are denied credit actually decreases. Moreover,
expected utility of borrowers increase, while that of lenders may increase under
certain conditions. Since co-financing by the government and a financial institution
or intermediary is a common occurrence, these results have policy implications.
These results have been derived under the simplifying assumptions of a closed
pure exchange economy. For future research this model can be extended for the
case in which neither of the above conditions are true. For example it might be
interesting to examine capital inflows and outflows in an open economy when one
country conducts these credit programs. Clearly, given that the seniority of debt
repayment is important, it might also be interesting to look at a subordinated
private lending structure. In this case with two private lenders, the expected return
of the prior claimant is going to be higher than the expected return of the residual
claimant. The natural question then is: Will this program reduce credit rationing?
Again, as before, the answer would depend on total monitoring costs. If total
monitoring costs are lower, then credit rationing will improve in equilibrium.
Finally, the efficacy of these credit programs has been analyzed under the
implicit assumption that credit is rationed in equilibrium. As an extension, it will be
useful to see how the above results change when credit is no longer rationed in JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 386
equilibrium. Also, given that credit rationing as well as government intervention is
widespread in developing countries, it might be interesting to analyze situations
where such credit programs are financed by seigniorage revenue or by taxing
borrowers.
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Differentiating  P
1 p with respect to x and equating the result to zero yields
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From (A2) it is clear that  0 *) ( ) ; ~ ( > > x x
P p d p for  . 1 < d
B. Proof of Proposition 5
From equation (42) and using the fact that the return to the prior claimant is greater
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The expected return per amount borrowed to the private lender is
Rearranging terms yields
)]. ( ) ( [
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Let  x denote the optimal loan repayment value. Then  x solves
. 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( = ¢ - ¢ = d p p x x x F
Now at x = x* = x* (x*  is the optimal value of x without intervention), pt(x*) = 0 and
pt(x* d)> 0. This implies F(x* )< 0. So, clealy, it follows that  * x x < and, from (A3),
*) ( ) ( 2 x x
P p p <  .
C. Proof of Proposition 6
The expected return to the government is given by
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Multiplying both sides by d yields
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From equation (26), mutatis mutandis,
.
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